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Abstract: There are three doctrines regarding the issue of the joint omission principal in 
academia of overall negative, said a comprehensive, and limited say. And all of these 
three doctrines have their own advantages and deficiencies as well, and all of them, in 
general, are unable to explain criminal phenomenon. It can scientifically demonstrate 
the issue of joint omission principal only from the perspectives of dominated committed 
and obligation committed. Joint omission principal can only be tenable in the omission 
field of dominated committed; and joint principal won’t be tenable in the filed of 
obligation committed or the field combined with both dominated committed and 
obligation committed. 
Keywords: joint principal; dominated committed; Pflichtdelikt; omission; and the 
obligation to make 
 
Résumé: Il y a trois doctrines sur la question de principe de négligence collective dans 
les universités. Et chacune de ces trois doctrines a leurs propres avantages et déficiences, 
et en général, elles sont tous incapables d'expliquer ce phénomène criminel. On peut 
démontrer scientifiquement la question de principe de négligence collective seulement 
du point de vue des dominés et de l'obligation. Le principe de négligence collective ne 
peut être tenable que dans le domaine de la négligence de dominés, et il ne sera pas 
tenable dans le domaine de l'obligation ou dans le domaine qui associe à la fois les 
dominés et l'obligation. 
Mots-clés: principe collectif; dominée; Pflichtdelikt; négligence, l'obligation de faire 
 
At present, criminal law scholars primarily discuss two issues regarding the subject of joint omission 
principal: the first one is that if joint principal is tenable among omission and the second one is that if joint 
principal is tenable between omission and act. There are three doctrines in academia of overall negative, 
said a comprehensive, and limited say. This paper, based on the introduction and commons on the above 
three doctrines, proposes its own unique viewpoints. 
 
1. THE THEORY OF OVERALL NEGATIVE 
Regarding the issue that if joint omission principal is tenable, there is overall negative theory among the 
criminal law theorists in Germany mainly represented by Armin Kaufmann, Welzel, and Grunewald. Based 
on his purposive act theory, for instance, Welzel believes that it is impossible that there is the intention of 
jointly execution in omission occasion, and accordingly it is impossible that there is the fact of jointly 
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execution, either; and it therefore denies the joint principal of omission (Ma Kechang.2002). G Grunewald 
believes that in terms of existence, non-typical negative crime is considered as the third criminal form 
which is even lower than accomplice, and there is no room for the concept of principal (Kamiyama Toshio. 
1994). 
Overall negative doctrine received criticism from plenty of scholar after it was proposed. Busse, for 
instance, believes that the intension in criminal law sense doesn’t indicate that in purposive act theory. 
Regardless of the different features of act and omission in terms of composition, these two should be 
parallel criminal pattern in terms of standardized values, though.( Klaus—Henning Busse. 1974) Japanese 
scholar Toshio Kamiyama, for another example, once criticized: “Grunewald positions all criminal patterns 
of non-typical negative crime as omission participation, the third criminal pattern, and believes it is a 
criminal pattern lighter than crime of act and accomplice, which is unacceptable. Since it ignored legal 
interest protection mechanism of criminal law, disregarded the existing situation that protector is equivalent 
to crime of act, and lacks essential equality between violation and obligation.” (Kamiyama. 1994) Author 
truly agrees above criticism. 
 
2.  THE THEORY OF SAID A COMPREHENSIVE 
This theory believe that joint principal all likely to exist in the situation when the dangerous states, caused 
by the interaction among more than two omission and the act on others from non-actor, are possibly in the 
protector status of protection obligation. This theory is truly agreed by many scholars in Germany. For 
example, Woerner believes that interactions among more than two omission or between act and omission 
all possibly constitute joint principal. For the former, two persons or more with obligations share the same 
determination of not executing their obligations; for the latter, failing to prevent the violations results 
generated from proactive act indicates the behavior of non-actor is the spiritual help for the act, but the 
behavior of omission from the protector later can not be rule out the establishment of joint principal 
(Kamiyama.1994). 
There is a considerable part of scholars in Japan approve the this theory. For instance, Ootsuka Masashi 
believes the situation that more than two persons with common obligation of act mutually contact crime 
intention and conduct the omission against their obligation can be concluded as co-execution and joint 
principal can be established (Ootsuka. 1993). Could joint principal be established between act and omission? 
Ootsuka Masashi believes that joint principal could be established between the act to execute a crime and 
the omission from a person in the protector status that could prevent criminal consequence from happening 
in the situation that both act and omission proceed under the intention liaisons between each principal of 
action (Ootsuka. 1993). In addition, Japanese scholars including Tatsuo Kagawa, Shinya Otani, and Utida 
Humiaki as well support this theory (CHEN. 2004). 
The criticisms on this theory from current criminal law scholars are primarily reflected in two aspects: 
the first one believes that in multiple omission criminals, it should be considered as joint crime if any 
person’s act could prevent the consequence from happening in all omission persons; in multiple omission 
criminals, it should be considered as joint principal if it needs all act from all omission persons to prevent 
the consequence from happening in all omission persons. For the former, Kamiyama Toshio illustrates via 
an example: if the father and mother don’t feed a child based on the intention to kill the child, so that the 
child was starved to death, and then both the father and mother will be for responsible for all their act, they 
can be reverted to individual principal and there is no need to apply the jurisprudence for joint principal 
(Kamiyama. 1994). Some one refutes Kamiyama Toshio’s opinion regarding this issue and believes that it 
will ignore the fact of intention liaison among the parents if this situation is executed as coincident 
principals, and the fact could generate mutually psychological promotion and is more dangerous than 
the coincident principals with no intention liaison, typical coincident principals then can not reflect 
this (Saitou. 2001). Secondly, comparing omission with act, omission plays a minor role in the joint 
principals constituted by omission and act, and it is more appropriate to identify non-actor as accessory. 
For instance, Jescheck believes by the time one party of participants complete the work division in 
proactive act while the other one is against legal obligation by not preventing the act of this actor, it is 
acceptable to determine the establishment of joint principals; however it is more in accordance with 
behavior dominance theory to identify non-act as accessory in this situation (Hans-Heinrich Jescheck and 
Thomas Weigend. 2001). 
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3.  THE THEORY OF LIMITED SAY 
Scholars in general discuss the issue of how to restrict omission joint principal from two aspects: if 
omission and omission constitute joint principal and if omission and act constitute joint principal. 
1) The issue that if omission and omission constitute joint principal. The issue that if omission and 
omission constitute joint principal has also been discussed in two situations: the first one is joint principal in 
form, or in multiple un-actors if one person fulfills obligation, then the consequence will be prevented from 
happening; the second one is joint principal in essence, or in multiple un-actors it needs to all un-actors to 
fulfills obligations, the consequence can then be prevented from happening. Scholars support The Theory 
of Limited Say in general believe that the former should not be established as joint principal yet the latter 
could be established as joint principal. 
2) The issue that if omission and act constitute joint principal. There is severe controversy regarding the 
issue that if act and omission constitute joint principal in the scholars in criminal law. Yamanaka Keiiti 
divides act obligations into two types: the first one, the act obligations based on protecting legal interests, 
which can be called as “legal interest protection type” obligation; the second, the act obligations generated 
for managing and monitoring hazard source, which can be called as “hazard source management and 
monitoring type” obligation. If the obligation actor owns belongs to legal interest monitoring obligation, it 
will establish omission principal as long as the actor violates this legal interest monitoring obligation and 
falls to prevent consequence from happening when the actor could do so, no matter what causes legal 
interest in danger is natural forces, animals, no criminal liability persons, or liable act. If what causes legal 
interest infringement is the criminal offence from others and as well the actor forms joint criminal intention 
with others, it then establishes the joint principal combined with act and omission. If act obligation is not 
the one based on legal interest monitoring, and it is based on hazard source management and monitoring 
obligation instead, then the non-actor should become the omission accessory. For instance, a dangerous 
animal feeder sees the third party drives the animal to harm a victim and the feeder could easily prevent this 
harm however failed to do so. And the feeder doesn’t constitute principal but the accessory of omission 
mayhem instead (Yamanaka. 1999). 
The Theory of Limited Say wins some support among the scholars in China’s mainland, Dr. Li Haidong, 
for example, believes that it is more appropriate to process omission as accessory instead of principal under 
the situation that omission and act jointly commit crime (LI. 1998). 
Through the interpretation on both the Theory of Said a Comprehensive and the Theory of Limited Say, 
it can tell that both of them, no matter the Theory of Said a Comprehensive or the Theory of Limited Say, 
have their reasonable part. From author’s viewpoint, however, they are all unilateral and arbitrary as well. 
Their deficiencies are reflected as: first, unilaterally and arbitrarily consider all act obligations own the 
commonness point to multiple persons at the same time totally ignoring the nature of act obligations, which 
is wrong; second, attempt to determine omission joint principal quality based on both the work division of 
act and intention liaison quality of actors, whose research output is doomed to failure. 
 
4.  AUTHOR’S VIEWPOINTS 
Form author’s point of view, the key reason that the scholars in criminal law are unable to solve the puzzle 
of omission joint principal is that we have been ignoring for a long time two types of crime: dominated 
committed and obligation committed. Differences in nature, principle of imputation, and the criterions to 
identify principal and accomplice for these two types of crime determine the methods and criterions taken 
to process these crimes in criminal law. 
Based on Jakobs’ opinion, the reason for charging dominated committed is that dominated committed 
organizes all persons under dominance within the organization field to commit a crime. The basic 
organizing act within an organization field is crime dominance (XU. 2005), among which the dominance 
determining principal quality is connected with the organizing act of the owner of the organization field; it 
should be based on the fact that if the act dominates the criminal event to evaluate the organizing act as 
principal act or participating act (Vgl. 1993). As for dominated committed, the person must consider the 
danger for others generated from its own free scope the corresponding relation between act freedom and 
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consequence is its attribution theory (organization jurisdiction), and the act is the medium for actor to bear 
responsibility. Therefore, negative obligation violation is always reflected as legal interest infringement in 
criminal law terms; or concerning dominated committed, its criminal essence is legal interest infringement. 
Both the extent of legal interest infringement committed by the actor the one of causal flow control 
conducted by the actor are closely related to the act of the actor; act division and intention liaison of the 
actors are the essential basis to determine their joint crime. Act plays a decisive role for dominated 
committed, therefore, the measure to determine it as principal can only be determined from the fact that if 
the act dominates causal flow of the legal interest infringement; the dominator will be the principal yet non- 
dominator will be the accomplice. 
Criminal law scholars call the crime against “the obligation to build up a common world with others” 
obligation committed. In Jakobs’ opinion, there is a system functioning as the foundation to strengthen the 
unity and the obligation of the unity is reflected as the positive obligation of obligation committed in 
criminal law term. For obligation committed, the jurisdiction identifying it as the principal is established via 
violating an obligation confirmed by the system (i.e. positive obligation-author); and it has always been 
established. It believes that the principal responsibility of obligation committed is generated from the active 
responsibility additionally placed by the system, i.e. request norm acceptors to “build up a common world” 
with others to make others become better, in stead of just making up the loss caused by its own (ギュンタ
一‧ ャコブス. 1999-6). The violation of its own obligation for the obligation committed supported by a 
certain system determines, in principle, its principal quality(Vgl. 1996). The positive obligation refers to the 
one to step into the fields of others and build up an active relation with others. It in general takes a 
systematical special status (role-author) as premise, the reason to let the individual take the responsibility is 
not due to the first act the individual conducted but due to its positive obligation infringement instead. The 
individual with positive obligation is responsible for protecting particular legal interest be due to entering 
into a certain system, he must also be responsible for what happens even if the consequence is not from his 
act. Therefore the infringement of special obligation is his attribution theory (system jurisdiction) and the 
act is not the medium for the actor to bear responsibility. As for the violation of positive obligation, it is 
always reflected in the function infringement against the system, instead of legal interest infringement. In 
terms of obligation committed thereby, the crime essence is just the violation against the positive obligation 
approved by criminal law, the measure to determine the principal can only be the violation against the 
positive obligation. 
Does omission committed include two criminal forms of dominated committed and obligation 
committed? The author believes that the key is if it can proof that whether or not the act obligation can 
include negative obligation, i.e. the obligation of not harming others, and positive obligation, i.e. the 
obligation of building up a common world with others; if yes, it then means the crime of omission includes 
these two types of crime. Professor Jakobs believes that isolated obligations, just like the obligations 
performed by the debtor in property law, are not generated from an active system and do not request 
obligors to build up a common world with others and proactively seek benefits for others; instead they are 
just the obligations in the organization fields of each personality body. The infringement against isolated 
obligations constitutes neither omission committed nor obligation committed (Jakobs. 1993). For instance, 
a father takes a neighbor’s child to swim. When the child is drowning, the father is obligated to save the 
child and this obligation is the one in the organization field of personality body, and belongs to negative 
obligation. If the child dies because the father failed to save the child, the father then constitutes omission 
intentional homicide of dominated committed. If the father takes his own child to swim, and the father is 
obligated to save the child when the child is drowning and this obligation is the one in the system (i.e. 
parental rights obligation) of the personality body, and belongs to positive obligation. If the child dies 
because the father failed to save the child, the father then constitutes omission intentional homicide of 
obligation committed. Act obligation can thereby include negative and positive one, crime of omission 
should also include dominated committed and obligation committed accordingly. Based on this, the author 
advocates that it also should start from the omission joint principal of dominated committed and the 
omission joint principal of obligation committed to study the issue of omission joint principal.  
4.1  Omission of Joint Principal of Dominated Committed 
As mentioned earlier, it is of great significance for division of act and intention liaison among actors for 
dominated committed. It is worth noting that the negative obligation of dominated committed can be 
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entrusted to a number of persons, i.e. the negative obligation of dominated committed owns the 
homogeneity pointing to multiple persons. For example A entrusts his/her own child to B and C to look 
after, and the B and C have common obligation to look after the child. Based on this point, in terms of 
omission committed of dominated committed, it needs to analyze specifically: 
4.1.1  Typical Negative Committed 
In a typical negative committed situation, if multiple persons all are obligated to the act obligation of 
organization jurisdiction “do not harm others”; then they certainly can confess joint principal as long as 
there is subjective intention liaison and objective co-omission among them. 
4.1.2  Non-typical Negative Committed 
4.1.2.1  Situations among Omission 
For dominated committed, it can divide the situations between omission and omission into two types: one is 
that the obligation of multiple actors can totally be performed by one person among the obligators, as long 
as one of them performs the obligation, the consequence can then be prevented; the other is that the 
obligation of multiple actors must be performed by the thorough cooperation of all obligators, the 
consequence can then be prevented. For the former, some people in the criminal law sector believes that 
there is no need to determine this situation as joint crime, and it will be just appropriate as coincident crime. 
The author doesn’t agree this opinion because it ignores the reciprocity of equal obligation among various 
non-actors. Under intention liaison, now that every act obligator is able to individually prevent the 
consequence from happening, then every omission actor still needs to depend on the un-prevention act from 
the other side, i.e. the omission from the other side if each omission actor accomplishes offense, it can only 
accomplish crime with the co-omission from all actors.”(ZHAO, XU. 2008-9) Therefore, as long as there is 
the fact of co-omission and with co-intention liaison, this situation can also constitute joint principal. For 
the latter, it then can definitely constitute joint principal. 
4.1.2.2  Situations between Act and Omission 
In terms of non-typical negative committed of dominated committed, the situations between act and 
omission could constitute joint principal; it needs to specifically analyze, though. 
First, if there are agreements before or in the middle of an incident among obligators with obligated act, 
and one of the obligators proactively performs act and other obligators yet don’t stop, which causes 
consequence, then it constitutes joint committed. For example, a husband and wife take a neighbor’s child 
to swim, while swimming the husband and wife agreed to throw the child into deep water to drown; and the 
husband then throws the child into a deep pool, the wife is standing by but doesn’t save the child, the child 
is then drowned. 
Second, it still constitutes joint principal for the obligator with obligated act and the obligator without 
obligated act if they agree before the incident or while performing positive act that the obligator without 
obligated act proactively performs act and the obligator with obligated act does not perform prevention and 
rescue act, causing the consequence. For example, A takes neighbor’s child to swim and C coincidently is 
swimming there. C recognizes the child is from his/her enemy’s family and then persuades A to allow 
him/her to throw the child into the deep pool; or when C is holding the child to throw into the deep pool A 
sees what C is doing and then stops it, C persuades A to allow him/her to throw the child into the deep pool, 
and C then throws the child into the deep pool after A agrees C to do so, and the child is then drowned. 
Third, it does not constitute joint principal if after the obligator without obligated act proactively 
performs act and the obligator with obligated act is about to rescue, and the former persuades the latter and 
the latter agrees not to rescue, which causes the consequence. For last example, C throws the child into the 
deep pool while A was not paying attention, and A is about to rescue, and C persuades A not to save the 
child and A agrees C’s request, and the child is then drowned. 
4.2  Omission of Joint Principal of Obligation Committed 
As mention earlier, for obligation committed the intention liaison between act and actor does not have 
fundamental significance. The measure for the principal of obligation committed is still the infringement 
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against positive obligation; and it does not make any sense for the portion of the contribution from the act to 
the consequence in determining the measure for the principal of obligation committed. In addition, it should 
be noted that the obligation in obligation committed has nothing to do with first organized act and it just is 
the request externally imposed on the actor directly by force, during which there are no prerequisites such 
as persons, incidents, and things needed, i.e. the positive obligation is a medium-free obligation. The 
medium-free nature of the positive obligation leads to its another extremely important attribute, or due to 
medium-free, the positive obligation can only be directly entrusted to the specific person (role) from 
outside; the obligator still individually performs his/her own obligation instead of co-performing his/her 
own obligation even if the obligator is among multiple persons seem in the same obligation status. For 
example, when a wife sees her husband did not feed their child, her obligation is not performed by forcing 
her husband to feed their child, instead she must feed the child on her own; in addition, what the husband 
has fed does not indicate that the wife has performed her own obligation as well. If the wife intends to starve 
the child to death by taking advantage of the time when the husband is away from the home, yet she does 
not succeed because her husband returns home ahead of time and feeds the child, the wife will be 
determined as attempted due to infringing obligation, which is the unique specificity of positive obligation 
(ギュンタ一‧ャコブス. 1993-3). Based on these natures of obligation committed, we then specifically 
discuss if there is joint principal between the typical negative committed and non-typical negative 
committed of obligation committed. 
4.2.1  Typical Negative Committed 
Among typical negative committed, the obligation among multiple persons is the positive obligation of 
“building up a common world with others”, which has no commonness. Due to its unique specificity, 
positive obligation can only point to each specific role, it requests that each being requested must unite with 
other, rather than a couple of persons, as an entirety, unite with others. Every single role performs its own 
obligation itself and has nothing to do with others. Yet it must be based on the existence of co-obligation to 
co-infringe co-obligation among multiple persons. If there is no co-obligation at all, then it does not make 
any sense to discuss so-called co-infringement (Vgl. 1999). Therefore, in the situation of typical negative 
committed of obligation committed, if multiple persons all have act obligation, then there is subjectively 
intention liaison and as well objectively co-act; however because there does not exist co-obligation among 
them, there off course does not exist joint principal, they can only be determined as coincident principal. 
The crime of abandonment specified in Chinese criminal law, for example, is the classic situation of typical 
negative committed. If based on intension of co-abandoning, both of the parents abandon the child to 
hospital entrance, they can not be determined as the joint principal of crime of abandonment because there 
does not exist co-obligation among two of them. Therefore there does not exist joint principal in the 
situation of typical negative committed of obligated committed. 
4.2.2  Non-typical Negative Committed 
4.2.2.1 The Situations between Omissions 
In terms of obligation committed, the situations between act and omission can still be divided into two types: 
one is the act obligations of multiple actors can entirely be performed by one of the obligators, and as long 
as one of them performs the obligation the consequence then can be prevented from happening; the other is 
obligations of multiple actors must depend on the joint force of obligators to be performed so as to prevent 
the consequence from happening. For the former, since there is no commonness of the act obligations 
among multiple actors, even if there are subjectively common determination and objectively common act 
among the actors, still they can not constitute joint crime. For instance, based on the common determination 
to starve the infant to death, both the husband and wife don’t feed the infant, causing the death of the infant 
for starvation, this situation then does not constitute the joint principal of intentional homicide from 
omission. For the latter, it still can not establish joint principal with the same reason as the former. 
4.2.2.2  The Situations between Act and Omission 
Currently, it is broadly accepted in academic world that in this situation, as long as there is common 
intention to commit a crime between actors and non-actors and one of them of multiple persons of them 
perform positive act, then all of them should be determined as joint crime. Just as Professor Roxin 
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illustrated via an example, based the agreement between two warders, one gives the cell door key to the 
prisoners, and another, against his obligation, doesn’t lock the outside door and prisoners then escaped. 
Both of them, based on the specifications in Item 2 of Article 120 in the Criminal Law of Germany, 
constitute the joint principal of the crime of releasing of prisoners (Kunio Midorikawa. 1994). The author 
believes this opinion is wrong. In terms of obligation committed, both the extent of work division and 
intention liaison among actors do not have decisive meaning, due to the unique specificity in positive 
obligation of obligation committed, it is determined that there impossibly exists joint principal in this 
situation. 
In addition, it is worth discussing that in terms of the situations between dominated committed with act 
obligation and obligation committed with act obligation, dominated committed without act obligation and 
obligation committed with act obligation, is it possible, no matter the act or omission of dominated 
committed or the act or omission of obligation committed, to constitute joint principal? The author believes 
that there is absolutely no possibility to constitute joint principal in these situations. The reasons are: the 
establishment of joint principal must take common attribution theory and as well the penalization basis as 
its premise, the principle of the attribution theory for dominated committed is the responsibility for 
infringing negative obligation (organization jurisdiction), its crime nature is legal interest infringement, and 
its establishing measure is whether or not it dominates the causal flow of the legal interest infringement; 
While the principle of the attribution theory for obligation committed is the responsibility for infringing 
positive obligation (system jurisdiction), its crime nature is the infringement of the positive obligation 
approved by criminal law, and its establishing measure is whether or not it violates positive obligation. The 
difference in attribution theory and penalization basis of these two types of crime determines that it is 
impossible for these two types of crime to establish joint crime; yet they can only be established as 
coincident principal. For example, A takes B’s child to swim and B happens to pass here when the child is 
drowning; and both A and B agree not to save the child, and the child then is drowned. 
Conclusively, the author believe that joint principal of omission can only be established in the situation 
among the omission fields of dominated committed; and joint principal can not be established in both 
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